Individual welfare and subjective well-being : commentary inspired by Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers by Hammond, Peter J. et al.
 
 
 
 
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap 
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information.  
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s):  Peter J. Hammond,  Federica Liberini and Eugenio Proto 
 
Article Title: Individual Welfare and Subjective Well-Being: 
Commentary Inspired by Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers 
 
Year of publication:  2011 
 
Link to published article: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/
2011/twerp_957.pdf 
 
Publisher statement: None  
 
  
Individual Welfare and Subjective Well-Being: 
Commentary Inspired by Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers 
 
Peter J. Hammond,  Federica Liberini 
and Eugenio Proto 
 
No 957 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
Individual Welfare and Subjective Well-Being:
Commentary Inspired by Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers
Peter J. Hammond: p.j.hammond@warwick.ac.uk
Federica Liberini: f.liberini@warwick.ac.uk
Eugenio Proto: e.proto@warwick.ac.uk
Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK.
2011 March 28th
Abstract
Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers (2010) question earlier results like Easterlin’s
showing that long-run economic growth often fails to improve individuals’
average reports of their own subjective well-being (SWB). We use World
Values Survey data to establish that the proportion of individuals reporting
happiness level h, and whose income falls below any fixed threshold, always
diminishes as h increases. The implied positive association between income
and reported happiness suggests that it is possible in principle to construct
multi-dimensional summary statistics based on reported SWB that could be
used to evaluate economic policy.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Easterlin paradox
Plenty of empirical work supports the proposition that, within any given
country, a person with a higher income is more likely to report a higher
level of happiness or other measure of life satisfaction. Easterlin’s (1974)
“paradox” arose because average reported happiness seemed to increase lit-
tle, if at all, with growth in national income per head, at least for “devel-
oped” countries in which most of the population has sufficient income to
meet basic needs. In particular, though US income per head rose steadily
between 1946 and 1970, it seems that average reported happiness showed
no long-term trend and actually declined between 1960 and 1970. This sug-
gests that, after basic needs have been met, further economic growth may
fail to enhance the average of individuals’ reports of their own happiness
or life satisfaction. Easterlin’s original appeared in a Festschrift for Moses
Abramovitz, who devoted his career to understanding the process of eco-
nomic growth in a historical context. At about the same time, the benefits
of economic growth were also being questioned by scholars such as Hirsch
(1977) and Scitovsky (1976).
The Easterlin paradox itself is the subject of the accompanying contri-
bution by Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers (2010) — henceforth SS&W — as
well as of the previous extensive article by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008).
Under a wide variety of circumstances, they find that an increase of personal
income does increase of the average level of reported well-being. Indeed, if
pressed to give a specific numerical estimate of the ratio between the increase
of the average level of reported well-being (measured using their particular
cardinal scale) and the increase in the logarithm of personal income, that
number should probably be 0.35. This, of course, directly contradicts what
the Easterlin paradox would say, if it could be applied in unmodified form
to the SS&W data sets.
Already there have been several decades of continual debates over the
precise circumstances under which growth leads to increased subjective well-
being, when both are suitably measured. The recent survey by Clark, Frij-
ters and Shields (2008), along with Easterlin’s (2010) prize-winning volume,
suggest that the debates can be expected to continue for some time yet.
SS&W have done us all a great service by examining the data as carefully
and in as much detail as they have.
An orthodox discussion might well quibble with some of those details.
For example, it may be important that SS&W follow Deaton (2008) and
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others in using proprietary data from the Gallup World Poll. Or, as East-
erlin et al. (2010) suggest, to consider data over a time period long enough
to exclude any possibility of business cycle effects. We might have been
expected to discuss such details, perhaps by taking up Justin Wolfers’ very
kind offer to use some of this proprietary data in order to run some alterna-
tive regressions on our behalf. We did not do so because we see no particular
reason to doubt the validity and robustness of SS&W’s results, at least for
the kind of data set they have chosen to analyze. Nor will we attempt to
settle the outstanding differences between Easterlin and SS&W.
Instead, we raise the broader question of whether the debate matters.
That is, we consider what significance, if any, this kind of empirical work
could have for economic policy analysis. This, we believe, accords with the
general theme of this plenary session, namely “New Ways of Measuring Wel-
fare”. Moreover, suppose we were to accept Easterlin’s strongest empirical
claims, along with the concomitant value judgement that development does
nothing to enhance individual well-being. Then we would have to wonder
what is left of the original raison d’eˆtre of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development and the International Development Agency
— two of the oldest and most prominent agencies of what has since become
the World Bank Group. Clearly, much is at stake.
1.2 Separating Facts from Values
Hume (1739, book III, part I, section I, paragraph 27) includes the remark
that “In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with” there
is an “imperceptible” change so that, “instead of the usual copulations of
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected
with an ought, or an ought not.” Thus, philosophers speak of “Hume’s Law”
as the claim that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”. More precisely,
the law refers to an “is–ought” or “fact–value” distinction between, on the
one hand, descriptive or positive statements of fact, and on the other hand,
prescriptive or normative judgements of ethical value.
Despite philosophers’ criticisms of Hume’s Law, one could argue that
economists should be especially alert whenever the propositions put before
us slip over the often unnoticed barrier between purely factual descriptions
on the one hand, and the values that purport to describe our aspirations on
the other. A good example of how often the barrier goes unobserved comes
in the familiar phrase “measuring welfare” in the title of this session. After
all, measurement by itself can only answer descriptive or positive questions,
and so is definitely on the fact side of the fact–value distinction. Whereas we
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take the view that the whole purpose of any attempt to measure individual
economic welfare should be to provide an indicator of how effectively an
economic system provides the goods, services, and public environment that
benefit its different individual participants in their attempts to pursue a
good life. This obviously makes welfare an inherently normative concept,
on the value side of the fact–value distinction.1
1.3 Well-Being as Evidence for Welfare?
Easterlin’s (1974) original title “Does economic growth improve the human
lot?” is actually considerably more subtle than “measuring welfare”. Slightly
rephrased and expanded, his title could become: “Is there any evidence that
economic growth causes its presumed beneficiaries to express more satisfac-
tion with their lives?” The rephrased question is obviously purely descrip-
tive or positive. It acquires much more interest, however, if the objective
evidence is thought to inform the answer to the prescriptive or normative
question, “Should economic policy be less (or more) oriented toward growth
and development?”
These thoughts lead rather naturally, however, to others more profound:
1. With Hume’s Law in mind, can any kind of factual evidence ever be
relevant for economic policy?
2. If some kind of evidence can be relevant, what kind can be?
3. In particular, is there anything at all relevant in individuals’ responses
to questions concerning their own life satisfaction?
A negative answer to the first question would deprive economic science
of most of its interest for those of us who were drawn to study it in the hope
of learning how the world can be made better. And the second question can
be met in part by a positive answer to the third, toward which we now turn.
Indeed, the rest of this commentary will consider attempts to measure sub-
jective well-being (SWB) in ways that can indeed provide evidence related
to the normative concept of individual welfare.
Specifically, Section 2 will briefly recapitulate traditional welfare mea-
sures. Some of these purport to be objective, while others depend on prefer-
ences. Thereafter, Section 3 addresses the question of what, if anything, the
1Some authors, citing the tradition of Robbins (1932), claim that one should instead
give the word “welfare” purely descriptive content. But then, at the risk of over-simplifying
Little’s (1965) cogent critique in a mere metaphor, we are in danger of pursuing mirages
in the arid desert of Archibald’s (1959) “essentialism”.
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new subjective measures may have to add these old measures, particularly
when considering their relevance to the normative concepts of individual
and social welfare.
Next, Section 4 reports an empirical test, showing a strong positive as-
sociation between income and subjective well-being. The final Section 5
suggests how further work could help understand better how useful mea-
sures of subjective well-being can be in providing factual evidence on which
to base normative judgements of economic welfare.
2 Traditional Measures of Welfare
2.1 Real Income
A traditional and objective measure of welfare has been annual income per
head. In any given year, we can compare and even add the incomes of
different individuals who face identical prices for all commodities. When
prices vary over time, or different individuals face different prices, incomes
need correcting for price variations. This is often done simply by dividing
income by a consumer price index or deflator, in order to produce a measure
of real income. Provided this index is the value of an observable fixed
commodity bundle or “market basket”, or even of some more sophisticated
price index based on some observable aggregates such as mean expenditure
shares for different kinds of good, the result is again an objective measure, as
in Oulton (2008). Indeed, in principle one could even divide personal income
by a different price index for each different consumer. See, for example, the
discussion in Boskin et al. (1996, 1998) and associated articles in the Journal
of Economic Perspectives devoted to the Boskin commission.
Only in a special case, however, do such objective measures correspond to
an exact price index based on the individual consumer’s own preferences. As
discussed by Hulten (1973) and by Samuelson and Swamy (1974), following
the pioneering work of Ville (1946), the consumer’s preferences must be
homothetic, which is equivalent to the very special case when the demand
for every commodity has an income elasticity of exactly 1. Then a Divisia or
chain price index with continuously revised quantity weights will be exact.
Even when preferences may not be homothetic, real income can still be
measured by what Samuelson (1974) calls a “money metric” utility function
based on Hicks’ (1956) measure equivalent variation — see, for example,
Chipman and Moore (1980), Weymark (1985), and Hammond (1994). This
money metric, however, is generally subjective to the extent that it depends
on detailed estimates of parameters that determine the consumer’s demand
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functions. It also depends on a reference price vector and, when extended
to consider aspects of the public environment, also a reference level for each
such aspect.
2.2 Human Development and Other Objective Measures
A self-sufficient farmer with no officially recorded income is obviously better
off than somebody with no resources at all beyond a pittance in the form of
an inadequate but officially recorded income. This neglect of what Sen (1977,
1981) calls “entitlements” is just one way in which a measure of real income
overlooks important dimensions of human well-being. Other dimensions,
including nutrition, health, functionings, capabilities and dignity, feature
prominently in writings such as Sen (1980, 1981, 1987) and Dasgupta (1993).
All these additional dimensions can in principle be objectively measured
based on a person’s observed circumstances. Life expectancy, adult literacy,
and an index of enrollment in education happen to be the three dimensions
included (along with GDP per head) in the UN’s Human Development Index.
Especially in health economics and medical decisions, well-being is of-
ten measured using “quality adjusted life years” (QALYs), which are also
based on medical practitioners’ observations and assessments of individual
health states. Just a small part of the relevant literature can be found
in Pliskin, Shepard and Weinstein (1980), Broome (1993), Wakker (1996,
2008), Bleichrodt, Wakker and Johannesson (1997), and Bleichrodt and
Quiggin (1997). One interesting way of integrating QALYs into a real in-
come measure of well-being has been proposed by Canning (2007).
3 New Measures of Well-Being
3.1 Subjective Well-Being
Psychologists’ use of individuals’ own reports of their happiness or life satis-
faction goes back to at least Watson (1930), who asked subjects to provide
answers on a graphical scale. An extensive review is found in Wilson (1967),
who emphasizes the reliability or intrapersonal consistency of “avowed” hap-
piness. The later surveys by Diener (1984) and by Diener et al. (1999) en-
courage us to use the term “subjective well-being” (or SWB). Easterlin’s
(1974) results relied on measuring a similar concept. So does the richer in-
terpersonal concept introduced by van Praag (1968), later explained more
thoroughly in van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008).
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One question raised by the work of van Praag (1971), Easterlin (1974),
Simon (1974) and many successors is whether new ways of measuring welfare
would make any difference. That is, if we measure SWB along with real
income and other older objective economic indicators of welfare, is there
any information at all that we could use to guide policy?
3.2 An Ordinal Objective Measure of SWB
For some specific value of n like 10, consider the question: “On a scale of
1 to n, how satisfied are you with your life in general?” Let us readily
admit that we ourselves totally lack confidence in how to give this question
any concrete interpretation, even before wondering what the “right” answer
could possibly be in our own case. About all one can say is that this may be
one relatively clear case where more should always be better. This reflects
how hard it is to give the concept of life satisfaction any objective meaning.
Anyway, this leads us not to attach too much significance to our own putative
responses or, by extension, to those of other individuals.
Nevertheless, suppose we were to consider the results of a large survey
whose respondents report not only a degree of life satisfaction or happiness h
in the set H := {1, 2, . . . , n}, but also what they believe to be their current
annual income y ≥ 0. For each x ≥ 0 and for each h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
let Fh(x) denote the proportion of individuals in the whole sample who
combine reports of an annual income y ≤ x with a satisfaction level of h.
Also, for each h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let Ph denotes the proportion of the overall
sample who report SWB level h. By definition, note that the sum F (x) :=∑n
h=1 Fh(x) is the overall cumulative distribution function for income. Of
course Fh(0) ≥ 0, while F (x) is non-decreasing in x. Furthermore, the
definition of Ph implies that
Fh(x)→ Ph as x→∞ (1)
Now, for each x ≥ 0 with F (x) > 0 and for each h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let
Ph(x) := Fh(x)/F (x) (2)
denote the relative proportion, among all individuals with incomes y ≤ x,
who report life satisfaction level h. We note that, because F (x) → 1 as
x→∞, equations (1) and (2) imply that
Ph(x)→ Ph as x→∞. (3)
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With these definitions, an objective measure of SWB among all individ-
uals reporting incomes y ≤ x is given by the n-dimensional vector2
P(x) = (P1(x), P2(x), P3(x), . . . , Pn(x)). (4)
Next, consider the n-vector of cumulative measures
Q(x) = (Q1(x), Q2(x), Q3(x), . . . , Qn(x)). (5)
where, for each h ∈ H, we define
Qk(x) :=
k∑
h=1
Ph(x). (6)
This is the proportion of individuals with incomes y ≤ x who report satis-
faction levels h ≤ k. Obviously Qn(x) = 1 for all income levels x. These
cumulative measures are important because an obvious necessary and suffi-
cient condition for SWB to rise with income is that Qk(x) falls as x increases
for each k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. That is, the proportion of individuals whose re-
ported satisfaction level is low must fall as one moves further up the income
distribution.
Note that, like an ordinal equivalence class of utility functions that rep-
resent the same preference ordering because all are strictly increasing trans-
formations of each other, the n-dimensional vector P(x) is ordinal because
its definition depends only on which happiness levels are ranked higher.
3.3 A Cardinal Objective Measure of SWB
A great deal of empirical work, including most linear regression studies,
ignores much of the richness in the data by simply replacing the different
components of each vector P(x) with the one-dimensional mean statistic
P¯ (x) =
n∑
h=1
Ph(x)h. (7)
This not only discards a great deal of information, however. In addition,
constructing P¯ (x) requires that happiness be measured on a cardinal scale.
Specifically, for every possible comparison such as P¯ (x) > P¯ (x′) to be pre-
served whenever the happiness scale H := {1, 2, . . . , n} is replaced by the
2We ignore the loss of one dimension that arises because the n proportions must add
up to 1.
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new n-point happiness scale H ′ := {η1, η2, . . . , ηn} with η1 < η2 < . . . < ηn,
it is necessary and sufficient that there be an additive constant α and a
multiplicative constant ρ > 0 such that
ηh = α+ ρh for all h ∈ H. (8)
We note finally that virtually all existing work concerning the Easterlin
paradox relies on cardinal measures of mean happiness such as P¯ (x) defined
by equation (7). We do not know if, along with different data sets, this
is really significant in helping to explain apparently inconsistent empirical
results. For the following discussion, however, we make a point of keeping
track of all n components in the vector P(x) defined by equation (4), for all
relevant different income levels x.
4 Could SWB Be Relevant? An Empirical Test
4.1 A Null Hypothesis
Consider the following rather extreme null hypothesis: for each x ≥ 0, the
relative proportions Ph(x) of individuals with incomes y ≤ x who report
different satisfaction levels h ∈ H are all independent of x. Equation (3), of
course, implies in this case that Ph(x) = Ph, independent of x.
Suppose that for all h ∈ H and x ≥ 0 we define
Gh(x) := Fh(x)/Ph (9)
as the proportion of all interviewees reporting satisfaction level h whose
income is y ≤ x. Then each Gh(x) is a cumulative income distribution
function for those interviewees, which satisfies Gh(x)→ 1 as x→∞. Using
equation (2) to substitute for Fh(x) in (9) gives
Gh(x) = Ph(x)F (x)/Ph. (10)
The null hypothesis that Ph(x) = Ph is independent of x ≥ 0 is therefore
equivalent to having Gh(x) = F (x), independent of h. Under this null
hypothesis, any reports of SWB would tell us nothing at all relevant to any
statements regarding the relative subjective values of different income levels
y ≥ 0.
4.2 An Alternative Hypothesis
A natural alternative to the null hypothesis that Gh(x) = F (x), independent
of h, is that Gh(x) decreases as h increases, for each fixed x ≥ 0. This
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corresponds to the hypothesis that, among individuals reporting happiness
level h, the proportion of poorer individuals with incomes y ≤ x decreases
as h increases.
4.3 Data Sources
Two different versions of both the null and alternative hypothesis can be
tested using data from the World Values Survey (WVS), as a particular
accessible source. The data had been collected from interviews conducted
in five waves between the years 1981 and 2008, for a total of 117,876 obser-
vations. In an attempt to ensure representativeness, the data we used were
restricted to wave–country combinations with at least 30 observations.
Apart from happiness measured on a four-point scale, the interviewers
also collected income data measured on an interval scale. In order to arrive
at corresponding distributions of annual individual income measured con-
sistently in year 2000 US dollars, the raw WVS data were transformed as
follows:
• extract the lower and upper bounds of whatever income range was
reported by the interviewee, then transform both bounds to measures
of annual income;
• use an interval regression to estimate a probability distribution of pos-
sible incomes for each interviewee;
• adjust for both exchange rates and price changes using data taken
from World Development Indicators (WDI) 2010.
The first version of the null hypothesis uses the income data directly. At
least one version of Easterlin’s paradox, however, considers whether people
become happier as the country they live in experiences growth in GDP
per head. It would be interesting in future to see how our null hypothesis
fares when confronted with the kind of long-run growth data whose use
Easterlin advocates. For the time being, however, we have limited ourselves
to a second static version of the null hypothesis, where individual income is
replaced by contemporaneous GDP per head for the country in which the
interviewee lives.
4.4 Results for the First Version of the Null Hypothesis
Figure 1 represents the transformed data graphically, with income x mea-
sured along the horizontal axis using a logarithmic scale. It displays the
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Figure 1: Four Income Distribution Functions
graphs of the four conditional cumulative income distribution functions
Gh(x), corresponding to each of the four different possible happiness lev-
els h ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The four graphs show a very clear positive association between happi-
ness and income, at least for the 98% of interviewees whose income levels,
measured in year 2000 US dollars, lie between about 50 cents and 300 dol-
lars per day. Indeed, the association is so strong that no two curves cross.
Specifically, for every threshold income level x, among all those individuals
who report the same happiness level h, the proportion Fh(x) whose income
is y ≤ x always decreases as h increases. In other words, those who report a
higher h on the WVS four-point happiness scale are less likely to have low
incomes, regardless of what threshold we choose to distinguish between high
and low incomes.
A formal two-sample one-sided version of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test
was also applied three times to the different adjacent pairs of conditional
income distributions in order to see whether each graph lies significantly
above its successor, in accordance with the alternative hypothesis laid out
in Section 4.2. The test was passed in every case with a p-value of 0.000.
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Figure 2: Four Distribution Functions Based on GDP Per Head
4.5 Results for the Second Version of the Null Hypothesis
In order to consider the second version of the null hypothesis, figure 2 re-
places the absolute income levels in figure 1 with national GDP per head.
The cumulative income distribution reports the proportion of interviewees
living in countries whose contemporaneous GDP per head, again measured
in year 2000 US dollars, was no greater than the income level marked on
the horizontal axis. Not surprisingly, there are some significant jumps in
the constructed distribution, reflecting how every interviewee in some quite
large countries shares the same national GDP per head.
Once again the four curves are not only distinct, but clearly ordered in
the same way as they were in figure 1. The same three Kolmogorov–Smirnov
tests were still passed with a p-value of 0.000. Thus, reported life satisfaction
is definitely positively associated with both personal income and with GDP
per head. Of course, this does not contradict the version of Easterlin’s
negative findings that focuses on long-run growth trends, particularly in
countries that were either already developed or have recently become much
more developed.
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5 Should SWB Be Relevant? Ethical Values
5.1 Two Extreme Views
Establishing a positive association between happiness and income is one
thing. Its relevance for policy is quite another. We have not even distin-
guished the hypothesis that income causes happiness from the alternative
possibility that happiness causes income, perhaps even at the national as
well as the individual level. Nevertheless, let us provisionally accept the
hypothesis that policies which increase economic opportunities will add to
measured SWB. Does that make a case for basing policy recommendations
on SWB measures? In fact, on this question there is scope for two extreme
opposing views, as well as no doubt many positions in between.
The first extreme is the skeptic’s claim that any empirical SWB analy-
sis is bound to lack normative significance. This is the implicit position of
traditional welfare economics, based as it is on concepts like revealed pref-
erence, willingness to pay, and money metric utility. It may be reinforced
by the view that individuals’ expressions of their own subjective well-being
constitute no more than how our County Bard chose to describe life itself:
“ . . . a tale/ Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,/ Signifying nothing.”
(Macbeth Act 5, scene 5).
The second extreme is the “hedonometric” claim that not only is SWB
relevant; in fact, only the mean of all individuals’ SWB reports matters and
so any other measure can be disregarded. This appears to be the position
advocated by Layard, amongst others — see, for example, Layard (2005,
2010) and Dolan, Layard and Metcalfe (2011). As already discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3, this extreme attacks cardinal significance to the different happiness
levels.
5.2 SWB and Pareto Dominance
Between these two extremes comes the view that SWB measures are relevant
to the comparisons one needs as a basis for policy recommendations.
For example, rather than base social welfare judgements on individuals’
reported preferences, could we not use SWB measures instead? Then one
might say that policy A has better effects for individual i than does policy
B, and so gives a higher level of i’s welfare, if and only if the change from
B to A would increase the estimated SWB, not necessarily of i personally
in a world of unreliable reports, but of most people sufficiently like i for
the comparison of SWB measures to be deemed relevant. Such personal
comparisons of different policies are already enough to determine a modified
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Pareto criterion, according to which policy A Pareto dominates policy B if
and only if the estimated SWB for every individual under policy A is higher
than it would be under B. Used in this limited way, estimated SWB may
be a more reliable guide than the usual welfare measures based on concepts
such as revealed preference, willingness to pay, or money metric utility.
5.3 Comparing Welfare Levels
For policy changes which are not Pareto improvements, however, some way
of trading off different individuals’ gains and losses is required. To see
whether this is possible, we may first ask when one can say that person
i has a higher welfare level than person j?
Traditionally, the answer has been: if and only if i’s real income is higher
than j’s. A fundamental difficulty, however, is the lack of any objective
measure of real income.
A new answer can use objective measures of SWB. Then we can say that
person i has a higher welfare level than person j if and only if people whose
objective circumstances are like those of i generally report higher SWB levels
than do those whose objective circumstances are like those of like j.
5.4 SWB and Suppes–Sen Dominance
Once we introduce comparisons between different individuals’ estimated
SWB levels, there may be an appealing way to express a preference between
two policies A andB even though neither Pareto dominates the other. A first
idea is to use Suppes’ (1966) “grading principle”, as Sen (1970) discusses.
Specifically, policy A will dominate policy B if and only if A would Pareto
dominate a (possibly infeasible) policy alternative B′ in which the different
individuals’ SWB measures are derived by permuting those achieved un-
der policy B. In particular, the distribution of individuals’ SWB measures
under policy A should dominate that of individuals’ SWB measures under
policy B.
A different way of expressing the same dominance condition involves
multi-dimensional cumulative distributions like the Qk(x) considered in Sec-
tion 3.2. The idea is to reduce the proportion of individuals whose happiness
level falls below each possible different h. For similar ideas see Dasgupta,
Sen and Starrett (1973) as well as Saposnik (1983).
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5.5 Progressive Transfers
Dalton (1920, p. 251), following an idea he ascribes to Pigou (1912), enun-
ciated what has since become known as the “Pigou–Dalton principle of pro-
gressive transfers”. This is the claim that transferring income costlessly from
a richer to a poorer person will reduce inequality so long as the transfer is
not large enough to reverse the ranking of the two individuals’ incomes. A
similar idea can be applied with measured SWB replacing income. That is,
one can regard favorably a different kind of progressive income transfer from
individuals with higher SWB levels to those with lower levels, as long as the
transfer is not large enough to reverse the ranking of the two individuals’
SWB levels. In this way, some pairs of policies can be ranked even though
neither dominates the other according to the Suppes–Sen criterion.
An extension of the same idea would be to apply the equity axiom sug-
gested by Sen (1973), though it is often ascribed to Hammond (1976). This
would regard any policy change as beneficial provided it affects only two
individuals’ estimated SWB levels, and increases the minimum of the two
SWB levels. Pushed all the way, this would take us to a modified “Rawl-
sian” maximin policy that maximizes the lowest estimated SWB level in the
whole population. This will usually differ from the usual maximin policy
because estimated SWB differs from individual utility, as usually measured,
and also because the measure applies not just to each individual separately,
but equally to a whole group of individuals who share similar objective cir-
cumstances.
5.6 Welfare Weights
We conclude with a final warning. The kind of ordinal estimated SWB
measure we have been discussing cannot provide sufficient information, in
general, to derive the welfare weights which are generally needed whenever
policy choices force us to trade off some individuals’ welfare gains against
others’ losses. Those trade offs require some form of cardinal information,
or at least social marginal rates of substitution between estimated SWB
measures for different groups of individuals whose objective circumstances
are similar.
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